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Authorship 
 
What is authorship?  How are answers to that question related to ideas about 
the understanding, interpretation, or appreciation of literary works?  In what 
follows I provide a selective survey of the voluminous literature on these 
divisive questions, offer criticisms of some influential theories, and present an 
alternative. 
 
Two Conceptions of Authorship 
It is often thought that creating or making a literary work is both necessary 
and sufficient to being that work’s author.  Authorship, then, amounts to 
performing certain kinds of actions, such as composing a song, writing the 
text of a poem or novel, and deciding when the work has been completed.  It 
is generally acknowledged that such work-constitutive actions can be 
performed either by an individual or by two or more collaborating persons.  
In many nations these basic ideas about authorship have been codified 
in legislation designed to protect not only intellectual property but the “moral 
rights” of authors, such as the right to control the conditions under which one’s 
work is made public.  German law, for example, rules that “Urheber ist der 
Schöpfer des Werkes” [The author is the creator of the work]  (Adeney, p. 
230).  Many nations have similar legislation, including clauses recognizing co-
authorship (for informative surveys, see Davies and Garnett 2010, and Rajan 
2011).  
Various philosophers and literary theorists have, however, contended 
that this notion of authorship is inadequate.  They claim that to read a text as 
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authored by someone, or to identify and think of someone as an author, is to 
accept—usually unwittingly—various ideological assumptions.  The ideology 
of authorship, they claim, blinds people to the fact that different social 
formations have different conceptions and practices related to discourse.  The 
modern European system of authorship does not discover or refer to an 
essence, but is a contingent social construction.  As one philosopher puts this 
prevalent thesis, “all authorship is constructed, assigned, and developed; 
there is no such thing as a given or natural, non-constructed author” (Morgan 
1988, p. 354).   Authorship is said, more specifically, to involve the attribution 
of authorship by readers or other representatives of the literary institution or 
system.  Authorship is therefore not equivalent to simply writing, composing, 
or creating a work.  
For shorthand we may refer to the two contrasting approaches evoked 
above as the ‘causal’ and ‘attributionist’ conceptions of authorship.  According 
to the causal conception, authorship is reducible to the actions that 
proximately cause a work to be created.  According to the attributionist 
conception, the writer’s or speaker’s contributions are insufficient to constitute 
authorship.  Instead, something more—something on the side of the work’s 
reception—is required, beginning with a system of authorial attributions.   
 
Foucault’s Attributionist Conception 
The single most influential example of the attributionist approach is Michel 
Foucault’s oft-cited (1969) lecture, “Qu’est-ce qu’un auteur?”  A thorough 
analysis of the published version of this lecture cannot be provided here, but 
aspects of Foucault’s position will be discussed in some detail since they are 
 3 
crucial to an understanding of the contemporary literature on authorship (for 
additional remarks, see Merquior 1985, Hendricks 2002, Livingston 2005). 
Foucault explicitly draws a distinction between the writer [le rédacteur] 
and the author or ‘author-function’.  He claims that in some discourses (his 
examples being a personal letter, graffiti on a wall, and a legal document), 
there is a writer but not an author, whereas various literary, philosophical, and 
other discourses have both a writer and an author.  The motivation for this 
distinction becomes clear in the following passage: 
 
Third characteristic of this author-function. We no doubt try to give a 
realistic status to this figment of our minds [être de raison].  This would 
be something within the individual, a “deep” instance, a “creative” power, 
a “project,” the originary locus of writing.  But in fact, those aspects of the 
individual that are designated as author (or which make an individual an 
author) are only our projection, in more or less psychological terms, of 
the treatment to which we subject texts, the comparisons we draw, the 
traits that we establish as pertinent, the continuities that we recognize, 
the exclusions that we practice.  All these operations vary according to 
periods, and to types of discourse (1994 [1969]: 801). 
 
The published English and German translations of Foucault’s essay get one 
part of this passage quite wrong.  Foucault’s ‘être de raison’ is mistranslated 
as ‘a rational being’, ‘ein Vernunftwesen’, ‘a rational entity’, and even as a 
‘being of reason’, whereas in fact the expression in French means ‘a figment 
of thought’, or more colloquially, a figment of the imagination. 
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In the transcription of the discussion that took place after Foucault’s 
talk, Foucault is reported as twice denying that he had asserted that the 
author does not exist (p. 817).   He presumably meant that he allowed that the 
author exists qua writer, or again that the author-function exists qua mode of 
reading and attribution in a given discursive formation.  What does not exist, 
according to Foucault, is an author tout court.  Foucault sometimes 
misleadingly said or wrote ‘auteur’ when he meant ‘la fonction auteur’ (e.g. 
when he said a personal letter has no author), but in the discussion he clearly 
asserted that his goal was to analyse the function within which something like 
an author could exist” [“J’analysais la fonction à l’intérieur de laquelle quelque 
chose comme un auteur pouvait exister”] (p. 818). 
In the passage cited above, Foucault explicitly espouses a strong 
historicist thesis about authorship, declaring that the author-constitutive 
operations vary with regard to periods and kinds of discourse.  He somewhat 
puzzlingly adds: “Yet one can find through time a certain invariance in the 
rules of the construction of the author” [Pourtant, on peut retrouver à travers le 
temps un certain invariant dans les règles de construction de l’auteur] (p. 
801).  In an attempt to flesh out this claim, Foucault turns to Jerome’s De Viris 
Illustribus [On Illustrious Men] (329-3 CE) and attributes to Jerome the 
following four criteria of authorial attribution:  
 
(1) a constant level of value 
(2) conceptual or theoretical coherence 
(3) stylistic unity 
(4) a single historical location 
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In the literature on Foucault and authorship, these comments about 
Jerome are either endorsed (e.g. During 1992, p. 122), or left unmentioned. 
Foucault’s claims in this passage are, however, highly dubious.  De Viris 
illustribus is a fairly brief bibliographical catalogue of works by 135 early 
Christian authors.  It contains no explicit generalizations about the conditions 
on authorial attribution.  Moreover, some of Jerome’s specific attributions flatly 
contradict the general criteria Foucault has attributed to Jerome.  For 
example, Jerome attributes the Epistle to the Hebrews to Paul while 
remarking that its style is quite different from that of other letters that are to be 
attributed to Paul.  This overtly contradicts criterion (3).  Jerome allows that 
works by Plato and Philo exhibit a very great similarity of both style and 
substance, but he cites a Greek proverb to the effect that either Philo 
platonized or Plato philonized.  Since Plato wrote long before Philo did, only 
the former option could be correct.  Here Jerome’s remarks could be taken to 
imply that a causal condition on authorship can trump Foucault’s criteria (1)-
(3).  Jerome’s actual attributions suggest that he recognized that the works 
firmly attributed to a single author can be written at different times and places 
and manifest strikingly different styles, attitudes, and levels of literary or other 
value.  Were one to reconstruct a theory of attribution based on Jerome’s 
particular judgements, the result would at best be that the four “criteria” listed 
by Foucault may be included alongside many other fallible indicators of 
authorship.  
 
The History of Authorship 
 6 
Many literary theorists and scholars have relied upon on Marxist assumptions   
in framing their claims about the historical emergence of the author-function. 
Economic factors are in the driver’s seat, followed up by legal constructions 
and the other rationalizations and devices of bourgeois ideology.  In some of 
the influential accounts that crop up in film and literary theory, a large 
population of critics and readers—the victims of bourgeois ideology—are said 
to have had astoundingly implausible beliefs about The Author.  A key source 
here is the straw man operation provocatively undertaken by Roland Barthes 
in his influential (1968) essay, “La mort de l’auteur.”  Barthes conjures up the 
specter of an essentially solitary and sovereign figure, a masterful and self-
conscious “Author-God” whose intention unilaterally determines the meaning 
of a unique and profoundly original œuvre.  To escape from the shackles of 
absolute intentionalism, the reader must severe the ideological bond between 
text and the Author, the assumption being that it is somehow impossible for a 
reader operating within the modern author-functional regime to explore the 
unintended meanings and significance of a texts while recognizing that they 
were written by fallible, more or less skillful human beings.   
Some literary theorists continue to applaud Barthes’ critique of the 
Author-God.  For example, Andrew Bennett writes that the Author-God 
conception is the apt target of “the most powerful explanatory discourses of 
our, of contemporary, culture,” namely, Marxism and psychoanalysis, which 
are to be credited with having revealed the human-all-too-human author to 
have an unconscious and to be determined by capitalist conditions (2005, pp. 
7-8).  Other literary theorists (Burke 1992, Gallop 2011) have noted that 
Barthes himself announced a kind of “friendly” return of the author some three 
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years after the publication of the original French text of “The Death of the 
Author.”  
Foucault notoriously linked the author-function’s emergence to that of a 
legal system of ownership that was supposedly established “towards the end 
of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century” (p. 799).  This is a 
strikingly misleading claim about the complex legal history pertaining to 
authorship (for relevant evidence, see Ardeney 2008).  Although the view has 
many defenders (e.g. Rose 1993, Woodmansee 1984), it is highly 
controversial to yoke the emergence of “the” hegemonic author-function to 
intellectual property legislation, such as the 1710 Statute of Anne in England. 
That Foucault’s historical conjectures are highly inaccurate has been argued 
by many commentators, including Lamarque (1990), Saunders (1992),  
Chartier (1992, 2003), Abrams (1995), and Kimmelman (1996).  By far the 
most extensive source on this topic is Vickers’ (2002).  Vickers amasses 
evidence in support of the conclusion that “The author emerged as a 
professional writer in the sixth century BC, and many of the attributes that we 
associate with authorship—a sense of individual identity, in style, attitude, 
literary structure; a hatred of plagiarism; a respected role in society—were 
already found in abundance in Greco-Roman antiquity” (2002, p. 527; for a 
feeble attempt to brush aside Vicker’s argument, see Maley 2010, pp. 34-35, 
who implausibly contends that Vickers should accept Foucault’s views 
because Vickers holds that Shakespeare co-authored some plays).  
 The idea that a radically distinct author function appeared in Europe 
sometime between the 17th and the 20h century discounts longstanding and 
recurrent aspects of authorship.  Very basic practices of authorial attribution, 
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starting with the identification, praising and blaming of the artifex or maker, 
had already emerged in earlier periods and so should not be identified as the 
unique product of a modern European economic, legal, and ideological 
formation.  Such evidence includes the sillyboi identifying the names of 
authors and titles on ancient scrolls; records of Greek literary competitions 
identifying the names of the competing authors; authorial self-identifications 
figuring within ancient texts from a wide variety of ancient cultures, including 
Egyptian wisdom texts; Aristotle-inspired, author-centered models of literary 
explanation in the medieval period (Minnis 1988); and multiple complaints 
about plagiarism written in the absence of intellectual property legislation 
(Ziegler 1950).  
Perhaps Foucault was wrong about the historical specifics but right 
more generally in promoting a historicist and attributionist approach to 
authorship.  Could such an account of authorship in ancient contexts be 
developed?  An apparent example is Alexander Beecroft’s (2010) 
comparative study of authorship in ancient Greece and China.  As far as 
Beecroft’s explicit definition of ‘authorship’ is concerned, he would appear to 
be a thoroughgoing attributionist: 
 
Authorship is a property ascribed to a literary text.  It reflects an 
attempt to ground and contextualize that text by assigning its 
composition and/or performance to a specific individual, real or 
hypothetical, and the narrative representation of that composition 
and/or performance constitutes a major category of evidence 
concerning authorship (2010, p. 16).  
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Beecroft’s attributionist definition of authorship finds a good part of its 
motivation in the poverty of evidence we have about the actual origins of the 
ancient texts he discusses.  Attributions of authorship, especially those 
presented in texts, can be studied in cases where we lack other evidence 
about the actual writing or composition of the texts.  It would appear, however, 
that Beecroft also works with a causal conception of authorship distinct from 
the attributionist one cited above.  For example, in his discussion of Liji [The 
Record of Rites] he comments that “We cannot be certain of its dating or 
authorship”  (2010, p. 42).  This remark makes good sense as a prudent 
expression of uncertainty with regard to the identity of the writer and the time 
of writing, but cannot be charitably read as a confession of ignorance about 
the long history of conjectures regarding the authorship of this important 
source for the Confucian tradition.  
 I turn now to some additional reasons why a coherent and sufficiently 
comprehensive attributionist account of authorship is not to be had. 
   
Objections to Attributionist Conceptions of Authorship 
At first glance, some of the influential attributionist accounts would appear to 
correspond to the following basic schema, where the description on the right 
hand side of the equation is supposed to provide an explication or clarification 
of the left hand side: 
 
Authorship = the authorship of work W is attributed to S
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As the term ‘authorship’ appears on both the right and left hand sides, the 
explication suffers from a molièresque circularity: one must already know what 
‘authorship’ means if one is to make sense of what is said on the right hand 
side.  One step towards a solution of this problem is to identify two different 
senses of ‘authorship’ figuring on the two sides of the equation, as in: 
 
Authorshipsense one = the authorshipsense two of work W is attributed to S 
 
In literary theory, the sense of authorship figuring on the right hand side of the 
equation is usually the wrongheaded ideology of Authorship that the author-
function theorist attributes to other attributors, as in Foucault’s potted account 
of Jerome’s attributional principles, or the Barthesian evocation of Romantic 
ideas about the Author-God.  So we are invited to understand ‘authorship’ as 
a term that refers to the range of cases where a wrong-headed idea of 
authorship is applied.  Such an explication purports to provide a socio-
historical debunking of the author function or ideology. 
A more appealing version of the attributionist scheme introduces a 
causal notion of authorship into the right hand side of the equation: 
authorship, then, is explicated as the attribution of work creation or 
production.  This would appear to make the explication compatible with the 
tempting idea that making or creating a work does after all have something to 
do with its authorship.  Yet anyone who is inclined to think of authorship as 
the making of works may still find this explication highly counterintuitive: does 
authorship require attribution?  Are there no created works that remain 
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unpublished? Are there no works the authors of which were never identified? 
How did the system of authorship ever get started? 
It is especially hard to see how an attributionist conception of 
authorship can account for an important category of cases, namely, those 
where an attribution of authorship does not identify all and only those who 
composed or wrote the work (where writing a work can be a joint action 
performed by two or more persons or something done by a single agent).  
More specifically, we ought to be on the lookout for: 
 
Ghost authorship: cases where a work has been created by someone to 
whom authorship is not attributed; and 
 
Gift authorship and forgeries: cases where a work is attributed to someone 
who did not actually create it. 
 
It is important to espouse an account of authorship that allows us to say that 
such cases involve incorrect attributions and that these attributions are 
incorrect because they do not successfully track the action of authoring 
performed in the making of a given item.  In a type of case that is often 
complained about in discussions of the social dimensions of contemporary 
science (e.g. Lawrence 2003, Kwok 2005), the prestigious and powerful head 
of a lab does not do any of the intellectual work and does not write up the 
results, but puts his name on the list of authors.  Although he did not perform 
the requisite actions, he wrongly claims credit for being one of the authors.  In 
literary contexts relevant cases include plagiarism, forgeries, and the 
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exploitation of unacknowledged ghost writers (for a presentation of a number 
of cases, see Love 2002 and Ziegler 1950; the latter documents ancient 
Greek and Roman complaints about plagiarism as well as 17th century 
treatises on the topic, such as Jacobus Thomasius Subaci’s 1673 Dissertatio 
philosophica de plagio literario; for a contemporary complaint about 
plagiarism, see Weber 2007). 
 A hard-core attributionist can bite the bullet and insist that there are no 
cases of ghost or gift authorship.  It is hard to see why such a position should  
be accepted, however, especially when the attributionist recognizes the 
actions performed by the readers, editors, and theorists who engage in the 
making of attributions. 
 
Fictionalist Conceptions of Authorship 
Assume that it is granted that phrases such as ‘Dickens authored Great 
Expectations’ are true by virtue of the writer’s actions.  It does not follow 
logically from this fact that the question of how the reader should interpret the 
text of this novel is thereby settled.  More specifically, the reader need not 
search the text for evidence of the actual writer’s attitudes and intentions.  
Instead, the reader might imagine an Author for this text along entirely 
different lines, developing this attribution in a fictional or ‘as if’ way of thinking 
(Nehamas 1981, 1986, 1987; Morgan 1988). The reader’s concoction of a 
make-believe Author is based on the features of the text and does not have to 
correspond to what is believed about the actual writer of this text and the 
historical context in which the text was written. The reader may find the text 
more interesting when ideas that were unknown to the actual writer are 
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brought to bear on its interpretation.  Perhaps the shift to a fictionalist 
approach to authorship allows the proliferation of meanings poststructuralist 
meanings longed for by some theorists.  
There are, however, objections to this fictionalist proposal.  One is that 
it amounts to a massive and insufficiently motivated revision of the way 
people generally read literature.  Attributions of authorship routinely express 
heartfelt belief: persons believed to have authored some work are admired or 
criticized for having done so.  Having read and admired work W by author A, 
the reader wants to find other works by the same author, where ‘the same 
author” does not refer to a figment of the reader’s imagination.  The fictionalist 
approach would appear to give the reader a desirable freedom, but may do so 
at the cost of preventing the reader from realizing the goal of discovering, or 
at least of trying to discover, the value and meaning of the actual writer’s 
works.   
This objection can by supported with reference to recent work by the 
psychologist Eefje Classen (2012).  The results of her experiments with 
readers indicate that readers’ understandings of texts are influenced by their 
beliefs about the persons responsible for writing those texts.  Readers 
develop a mental representation that includes the author’s characteristics, 
communicative intentions, and moral positions or attitudes.  When they are 
given what they take to be information about the actual author’s attitudes and 
background, readers’ understandings of the text take this information into 
account.  Classen’s conclusion is that “the theoretical claim that the author is 
irrelevant for the interpretation of literary texts is untenable” (2012, p. 219).   
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The fictionalist approach recommends that an adequate response to 
literary works can be had by thinking only about the attitudes of the implied 
authors, which are the personae manifested in the texts alone.  Such a 
recommendation is misguided if there are cases where features crucial to apt 
appreciation arise from divergences between the attitudes of the actual author 
and those expressed by the implicit authorial persona.  Autobiographies are 
cases that would appear to belong to this category.  While it would be naive to 
think that someone’s autobiography conveys only truths about that person, it 
would be absurd to read it as only making assertions about an implicit author 
to be imagined by the reader.  For example, when Jean-Paul Sartre writes in 
Les mots (1966) that he had no superego because he had his mother all to 
himself, this is a claim about the actual Sartre, not about some figment of the 
reader’s imagination. If in writing about my own life I deviate from what I 
believe, my reports are lies, not fictions or invitations to make-believe.  It can 
also be argued convincingly, as Alex Neil (1999) has done, that a poet’s 
insincerity can be critically relevant, even in a case where this insincerity is 
not manifest in the text of the poem and would not be discernible to a reader 
interested only in the attitudes of the implied author.  
 
A Causal Conception of Authorship 
Causal conceptions of authorship fill in the following schema: 
 
S authors some work, W, just in case S intentionally performs actions A1-An. 
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Performing an intentional action entails exercising sufficient control over one’s 
behavior: an involuntary sneeze is not an action (Mele and Moser 1994). This 
requirement is compatible with the intentional use of some random process in 
the generation of features of a work, since such a procedure can be 
intentionally selected as a means of production.  Yet someone who exercises 
no control over what is included in a text is not the author of that work. The 
sufficient control requirement on authorship pertains to the both the internal 
and external conditions under which actions and choices take place.  
Authorship is vitiated by coercion.  For example, when terrorists coerce 
someone into writing and signing a declaration, the hostage is not the author 
of the document.  Even milder sorts of coercion are deemed relevant: some 
critics who claim that Mary Shelly was not really free to reject Percy Shelly’s 
revisions of her text contend that her authorship of Frankenstein was thereby 
diminished or converted into a kind of collaboration; Bryon, on the other hand, 
freely allowed Mary Shelly to introduce revisions into the drafts she rewrote 
for him (for background, see Leader 1996).   
Which kinds of intentional actions are required by authorship?  
Livingston’s (1997, 2005) proposal is that authorship requires expressive 
actions, and more specifically, the making of an utterance.  And what is an 
utterance?  According to Grice’s influential proposal, ‘utterance’ refers to 
anything that is a (plausible) candidate for non-natural meaning, which means 
anything that is the result of a certain complex kind of communicative intention 
(as discussed in Grice 1989).  As Grice’s strictures about communicative 
intentions are highly problematic, it is preferable to work with the neo-Gricean 
account set forth by Wayne C. Davis (2002).  Here the key, utterance-
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constitutive intention is an expressive one aimed at indicating or manifesting 
the utterer’s attitudes. According to this proposal, expression need not be 
sincere, veridical, or original.  That an action is indicative of some attitude 
does not mean this attitude is actual (cf. “The clouds indicated rain, but it 
didn’t rain’.)  
Given these remarks about the sufficient-control and expressive 
intention conditions entailed by the making of an utterance, we arrive at the 
following causal account of authorship: 
 
S authors x just in case x is S’s utterance; and 
 
S1-Sn co-author x just in case x is their joint utterance 
 
If this seems far too broad, remember that ‘John was the author of the boring 
and poorly written email’ is perfectly good English, as is ‘Jacque’s missive 
was a tissue of cliches’.  To say that authorship requires the making of an 
utterance in a very broad sense leaves it open whether one wishes to make 
additional claims about sub-categories of authorship.  One might, for example, 
develop some distinction between everyday utterances and works.  The 
authorship of works, then, would be a subset of authorship more generally.  
This sort of thing is stipulated in many legal codes, such as the French 
legislation, where the problem of saying what does and does not count as une 
œuvre de l’esprit [a work of the mind] is handled by listing “statutory 
examples” (Adeney 2006, pp. 174-175). 
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The definitions of ‘author’ figuring within legal codes often include a 
novelty or originality condition: to be an author one must not only create a 
work, but the work has to be original.  The rationale behind this sort of 
definition is that only authorial achievements satisfying these conditions can 
earn someone the authorial rights the code was designed to protect.  Such 
legal usage is contradicted, however, by prevalent talk that allows that 
someone can be identified as the author of a plagiarism.  The plagiarist copies 
all or part of the text of a work previously authored by someone else; the 
plagiarist then deceptively categorizes or presents this copied text as the 
product of his or her own devising, and not as something that was merely 
copied.  We can allow that this is a species of authorship in our broadest 
sense and coherently go on to criticize the plagiarist’s deceptive action.  
Authorship is one thing, honest and valuable authorship is something more.  
The most viable version of a causal theory of the authorship of utterances and 
works is a non-honorific, value-neutral one.   
To come up with a conception of literary authorship, it would be 
necessary to apply some favoured distinction between literary and non-literary 
utterances or works, a topic that cannot be surveyed here (see Livingston 
2003 for a survey).  Also, different genres, such as the Petrarchan sonnet or 
the philosophical paper, clearly weigh additional success conditions on 
authorial intentions.  Finally, a detailed account of joint authorship must 
identify assumptions about the conditions under which a given action can be 
jointly performed by two or more persons, another complex topic that cannot 
be taken up here.  
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